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From the UK Independence Party to Forza Italia, populist incomers in democratic politics 
typically present themselves as challengers to the system itself as well as to its current 
occupiers. The implicit threat is that the wave of popular discontent which the newcomer has 
mobilised will be so powerful as to sweep representative democracy away completely. The 
threat is rhetorical, but it is not always empty. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), founded in 
March 1981 by a group of prominent Labour MPs, based its appeal on a populist rejection of a 
blocked political system dominated by two extremes - Left-dominated Labour and Thatcherite 
Conservatism. In its first twelve months, the party won two parliamentary by-elections and 
took 42% of the vote in a third; opinion poll ratings for the SDP/Liberal Party alliance peaked 
at 50%. The SDP aspired to ‘break the mould’ of British politics; a contemporary joke had it 
that they were on course to do so, by replacing it with a one-party state. 
 
Three recent books prompt reflections on populist insurgencies in electoral politics and the 
conditions under which they can make a lasting impact. Matthew Worley’s history begins fifty 
years before the foundation of the SDP, when another group of high-profile Labour MPs 
responded to political stagnation by forming a breakaway party calling for a new style of 
politics. Unlike the SDP, Oswald Mosley’s New Party never won an election; less than two 
years after its formation, having lost all its MPs at the October 1931 general election, the party 
dissolved into Mosley’s new venture, the British Union of Fascists. 
 
What was it about the conjuncture of 1931 that enabled the formation of the New Party - and 
its resounding failure? Can we identify connections between the New Party’s populism and 
Mosley’s eventual move towards Fascism? Worley’s brief, densely-written and mercifully 
well-indexed book puts the New Party on the map, albeit as a political failure - but “a political 
failure that was nevertheless peculiarly resonant of its times” (p. 11). Worley’s study does not 
underplay the complexity of the New Party and its milieu, but makes it possible to suggest 
some key factors in the party’s rapid rise and precipitous fall. The New Party confronted a 
minority Labour government, seemingly powerless to address a growing economic crisis; the 
government was threatened from the Right by withdrawal of Liberal support and from the Left 
by the Independent Labour Party (ILP) minority within its own ranks. This gave the New 
Party’s broad-brush critique of the ‘old politics’ wide populist resonance; Worley cites Mosley 
calling on society to choose between ‘the right to live’ and ‘the right to blather’ (p. 32). 
 
However, the New Party was not simply a populist lightning-rod for anti-party dissent; if 
anything, the party’s positive appeal was only too precisely defined. The party grew from a 
milieu of aristocratic dissent (Mosley was a hereditary baronet and a Labour MP), fuelled by 
the contempt for the ‘old guard’ felt across Europe following World War I. It appealed at once 
to British imperialist interests and to working-class solidarity, proposing to transform politics 
using modern business methods and to transform business through centralised planning. The 
overall effect was a programme which could almost have been designed to appeal as narrowly 
as possible. New Party recruitment was no less idiosyncratic. Early recruits were drawn from 
the Conservative and Liberal Parties as well as from Labour - the ILP in particular; little united 
them other than dissatisfaction with their previous allies. 
 
Worley persuasively relates the party’s anti-democratic tendencies to a broader rootlessness - 
almost a vocation for marginality. Lacking any implantation within the mainstream of political 
debate, Mosley ultimately had little around which to unite his disparate and discontented 
followers, apart from rejection of the democratic parties from which they had come - and by 
extension of democracy. This rejection rapidly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Seen as a 
vehicle through which Mosley could act out his rejection of the political game, the New Party 
was understandably of little interest to any other player. Conservative Party leader Stanley 
Baldwin disdained to treat Mosley as a politician at all, dismissing him as “a cad and a wrong 
’un” (p. 128). (Baldwin’s view may have been hardened by the experiences of his son Oliver, a 
Labour MP who briefly defected to the New Party before returning to Labour.) 
 
Political insurgents, like social movements, have need of elite allies; lacking these, Mosley 
rapidly ran through the New Party’s resources (material, ideological and human) and was 
forced to look further afield. Worley demonstrates that the founding of the BUF in October 
1932 was only the culmination of the New Party’s evolution towards Fascism; Mosley had met 
Mussolini in January 1932 and overseen a merger with other British Fascist groups in April, 
while Nupa, the militaristic New Party youth movement which would supply many future BUF 
members, had been launched as early as October 1931. 
 
The capacity to attract elite allies is perhaps the key characteristic which saved the Tea Party 
from the New Party’s fate. The history of the Tea Party, the main contemporary populist 
challenger in US politics, is marked neither by electoral failure nor - despite some early 
warnings - by a drift towards Fascism. Launched in 2009 following the inauguration of Barack 
Obama, the Tea Party is - or is seen as - a grass-roots populist insurgency, aiming to ‘take back 
America’ from an over-mighty federal government believed to be intent on imposing atheism, 
political correctness and socialism. Federal taxation, and purportedly wasteful or deleterious 
government welfare initiatives such as ‘ObamaCare’, are key symbolic targets; the ‘Tea Party’ 
label evokes the Boston Tea Party, while one popular back-formation has it that ‘Tea’ is an 
acronym standing for ‘Taxed Enough Already’. 
 
The Tea Party’s successes have been achieved within and through the Republican Party; in at 
least some of its goals, the Tea Party has the enthusiastic support and assistance of elite 
Republican lobbying groups. For Anthony DiMaggio, the story of the Tea Party is the story of 
how these groups have worked through what only purports to be a social movement. DiMaggio 
makes use of the Chomsky/Herman ‘propaganda model’, situating the Tea Party as a case 
study of ‘manufacturing dissent’ (p. 173). He refers to the social movement literature, but uses 
it primarily as a checklist against which to judge - and disqualify - the Tea Party (“According 
to these definitions, the Tea Party falls short of being a social movement in every area” (p. 41; 
emphasis in original)). Although DiMaggio has carried out primary research among local Tea 
Party organisers, his framing of the Tea Party as a top-down ‘astroturf’ operation is 
unremitting; the chapter reporting his research is titled ‘The Tea Party Does Not Exist’. 
 
Faced with US news media’s consistent overestimation of the Tea Party, particularly when 
compared with their failure to cover genuinely radical grass-roots movements, DiMaggio’s 
polemical stance is understandable, but it represents a missed opportunity to use the tools of 
social movement analysis to understand the Tea Party - or, at least, to understand those 
individuals who chose (and continue to choose) to rally to the Tea Party standard, whatever the 
role of elite influences in keeping the standard raised. Some sociological analysis of Tea Party 
sympathisers is offered, but the force of the analysis is blunted by DiMaggio’s decision to treat 
a selection of ‘intangible hegemonic forces’ such as ideology as independent variables, 
alongside material factors such as household income. The effect of this methodological choice 
is to downplay the agency of Tea Party supporters in favour of that of media sources such as 
Fox News, held responsible for disseminating radical right-wing ideological perspectives.  
 
Rosenthal and Trost’s collection, the product of a 2010 conference at the Berkeley Center for 
Right-Wing Studies, takes a broader view of the Tea Party mobilisation, characterising it 
unproblematically as a right-wing social movement. Devin Burghart gives a detailed account 
of the main Tea Party organisations, tracing their connections with elite Republican circles on 
one hand and right-wing grass-roots groups on the other; the Tea Party can be seen as a bridge, 
and to some extent a meeting-place, between ‘respectable’ elite lobbying interests and a 
hinterland of Libertarian, conservative Christian, anti-immigrant and militia groups. Alan 
Abramowitz and Clarence Lo consider the Tea Party as a product of - and a contributor to - the 
long-term polarisation of the Republican Party, while both Martin Cohen and Peter 
Montgomery relate it to past attempts to dominate the party by the religious Right. Lisa Disch 
and Joseph Lowndes give sophisticated accounts of the relationship between racism and the 
Tea Party phenomenon, echoing Abramowitz’s finding that ‘racial resentment’ and personal 
dislike of Barack Obama are strong predictors of Tea Party support. Melissa Deckman genders 
Tea Party support, noting that age and income are better predictors of Tea Party support among 
men than women; Tea Party women are not demographically differentiated from Republican 
women in general, but are more likely to be religiously observant. Lastly, the notion of Tea 
Party populism is debated by Charles Postel and Chip Berlet: Postel maintains that the Tea 
Party is not coherently populist, but a partisan conservative movement with a highly specific 
agenda, while Berlet relates it to the specific current of ‘right-wing producerist populism’. 
 Like the New Party, the Tea Party can be understood in terms of political opportunities and 
framing transactions. In terms of the opportunities leading to the group’s formation, both 
Postel and Disch persuasively present the Tea Party as a defensive mobilisation by groups who 
had - or believed they had - much to lose under Obama. Taking as her starting-point the 
seemingly self-contradictory slogan “Keep your government hands off my Medicare”, Disch 
argues that a key mobilising dynamic is “white racial identification facilitated by liberal social 
welfare policies” (p. 142); which is to say, the key word in the slogan quoted above is ‘my’. 
 
Apparent political blockage, combined with threatened loss of social status, thus created a 
perceived urgent need to organise outside and against the political mainstream; this 
combination of factors was also experienced by the discontented ‘bright young things’ who 
founded the New Party, and by the first wave of disaffected recruits to the party. Once 
launched, however, the groups were faced with very different constellations of political 
opportunities, and their fortunes diverged rapidly. The Tea Party movement was rapidly - some 
would say immediately - instrumentalised by elite forces pushing for a realignment of the 
Republican Party and US politics more broadly, and shed or marginalised most of its more 
intransigent and idiosyncratic elements in the process. By contrast, the New Party was met 
with (justifiable) distrust and incomprehension; as a result, it lost most of those members and 
sympathisers who might have provided a bridge into mainstream politics, and built a new 
identity around the intransigence of those who remained.  
 
Elite endorsement (or co-option) is also a key factor on the ideological plane. After considering 
the heterogeneity and the failure of the New Party, it comes as something of a surprise to note 
how wide a range of ideological themes the Tea Party draws on: supporters are as likely to be 
mobilised by opposition to illegal immigration or gun control, or by ‘culture war’ issues such 
as Darwinian evolution or gay marriage, as by the core tax-cutting agenda. The fiscal 
conservative Right, which originally raised the Tea Party banner, was historically associated 
with social liberalism; nevertheless, association with the religious and nativist Right now 
appears to be acceptable. Nor does the purity of the Tea Party’s populist opposition to ‘politics 
as usual’ appear to have been compromised, in the eyes of its supporters, by its association 
with well-rooted factions - and long-running battles of position - within the Republican Party. 
 
Two sets of framing transactions are crucial here: those which group heterogeneous framings 
together by association with a single ‘master frame’ (in this case, that of the Tea Party itself), 
and those which associate an insurgent’s political positions with the attention-grabbing novelty 
of a populist outsider. It seems that whether these can be carried out is more a question of 
political agency than of the actual heterogeneity - or novelty - of the positions involved. While 
Berlet’s positioning of the Tea Party within the family tree of American populism is precise 
and persuasive, it can also be argued that populist is as populist does: the Tea Party can be 
classed as a populist phenomenon, not because it is a bearer of populist ideology, but because 
it successfully presents itself as an outsider, attacking the unaccountable machinations of party 
apparatchiks from a base rooted in popular mobilisation. Though DiMaggio is right to stress 
that this outsider status is as much apparent as real, the Tea Party’s ability to adopt it - while 
retaining elite allies - is a key factor in its success to date. The New Party in its short life had a 
much better claim to outsider status, but never had the political resources to develop a coherent 
‘master frame’ of its own to which a credible outsider labelling could be attached. 
 
The fortunes of these two very different movements suggest a broader lesson for populist 
insurgents: before you denounce the entire system, make sure of your elite allies inside the 
gates. The most successful populist insurgencies are those which are pushing at an open door. 
